Commit eace9bd9 authored by Charlotte's avatar Charlotte
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parent 89593f21
......@@ -19,10 +19,8 @@
number = {8},
pages = {1355-1387},
volume = {54},
abstract = {We consider the situation in which digital data is to be reliably transmitted over a discrete, memoryless channel (DMC) that is subjected to a wire-tap at the receiver. We assume that the wire-tapper views the channel output via a second DMC. Encoding by the transmitter and decoding by the receiver are permitted. However, the code books used in these operations are assumed to be known by the wire-tapper. The designer attempts to build the encoder-decoder in such a way as to maximize the transmission rate R, and the equivocation d of the data as seen by the wire-tapper. In this paper, we find the trade-off curve between R and d, assuming essentially perfect (“error-free”) transmission. In particular, if d is equal to H s, the entropy of the data source, then we consider that the transmission is accomplished in perfect secrecy. Our results imply that there exists a C8 > 0, such that reliable transmission at rates up to CS is possible in approximately perfect secrecy.},
doi = {},
eprint = {},
url = {},
......@@ -37,8 +35,7 @@ year="2012",
publisher="Springer Berlin Heidelberg",
address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
abstract="The wiretap channel is a setting where one aims to provide information-theoretic privacy of communicated data based solely on the assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is ``noisier'' than the channel from sender to receiver. It has developed in the Information and Coding (I{\&}C) community over the last 30 years largely divorced from the parallel development of modern cryptography. This paper aims to bridge the gap with a cryptographic treatment involving advances on two fronts, namely definitions and schemes. On the first front (definitions), we explain that the mis-r definition in current use is weak and propose two alternatives: mis (based on mutual information) and ss (based on the classical notion of semantic security). We prove them equivalent, thereby connecting two fundamentally different ways of defining privacy and providing a new, strong and well-founded target for constructions. On the second front (schemes), we provide the first explicit scheme with all the following characteristics: it is proven to achieve both security (ss and mis, not just mis-r) and decodability; it has optimal rate; and both the encryption and decryption algorithms are proven to be polynomial-time.",
......@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
% Literatur
......@@ -154,7 +155,7 @@
%d_{max}=\Delta = \frac{1}{K} H(S^K|Z^N)\\
\bar{R}=\{(R,d): 0\leq R\leq C_M;~ 0\leq d\leq H_s;~ Rd\leq H_s\Gamma(R)\}\label{eq:def:Rd}\\
\text{mit }\Gamma (R)= \max_{p(x)} I(x;y)-I(x;z)
\text{mit }\Gamma (R)= \max_{p(x)} I(x;y|z)=\max_{p(x)} I(x;y)-I(x;z)
$p(x)$ bezeichnet hier die W'keit, dass das Symbol $X$ von der Quelle gesendet wird.
......@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ $p(x)$ bezeichnet hier die W'keit, dass das Symbol $X$ von der Quelle gesendet w
% \label{fig:visgamma}
% \label{fig:visgamma}
\caption{Beispiel: BECs mit $\epsilon_{M}=0.1$ und $\epsilon_{MW}=0.46$}
......@@ -458,7 +460,9 @@ $p(x)$ bezeichnet hier die W'keit, dass das Symbol $X$ von der Quelle gesendet w
\item[$-$] \textbf{Kanalkapazität:}\\
Eine Geheimhaltung funktioniert nur, wenn der Gesamtkanal des Abhörers schlechter ist als der Hauptkanal
%\section{Physical Layer Security}
......@@ -532,7 +536,6 @@ $p(x)$ bezeichnet hier die W'keit, dass das Symbol $X$ von der Quelle gesendet w
% Folien, die nach \texttt{\textbackslash beginbackup} eingefügt werden, zählen nicht in die Gesamtzahl der Folien.
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